The Effects of Small versus Large-Scale Privatization on GDP Growth in EU Transition Economies by Karavasilev, Yani
Osaka University
Title The Effects of Small versus Large-Scale Privatization on GDPGrowth in EU Transition Economies
Author(s)Karavasilev, Yani
Citation国際公共政策研究. 18(1) P.269-P.284
Issue Date2013-09
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/50276
DOI
Rights
 269
		 ＊	Master	Student,	Osaka	School	of	International	Public	Policy,	Osaka	University.
The	Effects	of	Small	versus	Large-Scale	Privatization		
on	GDP	Growth	in	EU	Transition	Economies
Yani	KARAVASILEV＊
Abstract
	 There	have	been	many	attempts	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	privatization	on	the	economic	performance	of	
transition	countries	in	Eastern	Europe.	While	most	studies	have	drawn	general	region-wide	conclusions	
about	 its	 impact,	 the	present	 study	demonstrates	 that	privatization	has	had	contradictory	 impacts,	
depending	on	which	country	is	concerned,	and	on	whether	small	or	large-scale	privatization	is	considered.	
The	analysis	 raises	 the	 issue	of	 the	dynamic	effects	of	privatization	and	provides	support	 for	 recent	
investigations	claiming	that	certain	factors,	such	as	the	quality	of	institutions	and	the	amount	of	FDI	stock	
in	a	country	could	override	the	effects	of	privatization	on	economic	growth.
Keywords : privatization,	GDP	growth,	transition	economies,	EU
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1.	 Introduction
	 After	the	collapse	of	communism	in	Eastern	Europe,	the	economies	of	the	so-called	transition	countries	have	
been	undergoing	an	unprecedented	transformation,	shifting	from	centrally	planned	to	market-directed	ones.	
This	transformation	has	taken	different	paths	in	different	transition	countries,	and	as	becomes	obvious	from	a	
simple	glimpse	at	economic	statistics,	they	have	achieved	different	levels	of	success,	the	sterling	examples	
being	the	countries	in	Central	Europe,	with	Central	Asian	countries	scattered	at	the	opposite	end	of	the	ladder.	
Naturally,	 the	question	of	why	some	countries	have	been	vastly	more	successful	 than	others	has	been	the	
object	of	much	academic	attention,	and	in	this	stream	of	research	one	of	the	most	widely	investigated	issues	
has	been	the	effect	of	economic	reforms,	such	as	price	and	trade	liberalization	and	privatization,	on	economic	
growth	as	measured	by	the	GDP.	Of	these,	privatization	that	took	place	in	EU	member	transition	countries	
will	be	the	main	focus	of	this	study.	In	particular,	 the	effects	of	small-scale	privatization	and	of	large-scale	
privatization	will	be	examined	and	compared.
2.	 Literature	review
	 There	exists	a	great	amount	of	literature	on	the	effects	of	free	market	reforms	and	liberalization	on	economic	
growth	in	transition	countries.	Empirical	literature,	in	specific,	dates	back	to	around	1996	when	economists	
thought	that	they	had	enough	data	to	test	hypotheses	formally.	Notable	macroeconomic	studies	in	the	field	
include	Berg	et	al.	(1999),	De	Melo	et	al.	(1996,	2001),	Falcetti	et	al.	(2002),	Fischer	et	al.	(1996a,	1996b),	
Havrylyshyn	et	al.	(1999)	and	Hernández-Catá	(1997).	Additionally,	Havrylyshyn	(2001)	provides	a	useful	
survey	of	 the	main	 literature	up	 to	 the	year	2000,	and	Djankov	and	Murrell	 (2002)	have	summarized	
microeconomic	literature	on	the	topic.	
	 As	far	as	EU	member	countries	are	concerned,	privatization	seems	to	have	been	most	extensively	studied	in	
Poland,	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia,	Hungary	and	East	Germany.	Studies	related	to	the	Baltic	countries	are	
somewhat	 less	available,	and	ones	focused	on	Bulgaria	and	Romania	seem	to	be	the	most	scarce.	With	a	
particular	relevance	to	the	present	study	are	Gouret	(2007),	Falcetti	et	al.	(2006)	and	Zinnes	et	al.	(2001)	
discussed	hereafter.
	 Starting	chronologically,	it	can	be	said	that	most	of	the	earlier	studies	argued	that	reforms	are	beneficial	to	
growth.	For	example,	Sunita,	et	al.	(2002)	and	Anderson	et	al.	(1996)	justified	this	view	by	focusing	on	the	
productivity	gains	that	result	from	privatization.	In	addition,	Brada	(1996),	after	evaluating	the	overall	impact	
of	the	chief	methods	of	privatization	employed	across	Eastern	Europe	and	the	former	Soviet	Union	in	the	first	
half	of	the	1990s,	contended	that	privatization	can	stimulate	small	businesses	and	thereby	lead	to	an	increase	
in	productive	efficiency	and	act	as	a	 lure	for	 foreign	direct	 investment	and	speed	 the	painful	process	of	
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restructuring	industry.	Further	empirical	studies	also	pointed	to	the	fact	that	privatized	enterprises	outperform	
state	enterprises.	(Havrylyshyn	and	McGettigan,	1999)	and	several	papers,	 including	Havrylyshyn	and	van	
Rooden	(2003),	concluded	that	 the	early-stage	policies	of	 liberalization	and	small-scale	privatization	have	
been	the	main	determinants	of	growth.	
	 By	the	year	2000	a	consensus	had	emerged	on	three	points,	according	to	Falcetti	et	al.	(2006):	“First,	macroeconomic	
stabilization	 is	necessary	 for	 recovery	and	growth.	Second,	although	 initial	conditions	do	matter,	 their	
influence	on	growth	is	declining	steadily	over	time.	Third,	the	impact	of	structural	reforms	is	strong	and	robust.”
	 More	recent	investigations,	however,	have	found	ambiguous	effects	of	reforms	–	Zinnes	et	al.	(2001),	who	
investigated	the	relationship	between	privatization	and	output	behavior	concluded	that	privatization	does	not	
have	a	 significant	 impact,	unless	 the	budget	constraint	 is	hard	enough	and	 the	 legal	and	 institutional	
framework	of	a	country	permits	owners	 to	control	 their	 firms.	 In	 the	same	vein,	using	EBRD	transition	
indicators	for	large-scale	privatization,	governance	and	enterprises	restructuring	to	assess	reform,	Falectti	et	
al.	(2002)	found	that	although	contemporaneous	reforms	affect	growth	negatively	and	lagged	reform	does	so	
positively,	 the	 two	 impacts	 eventually	 cancel	 out.	Furthermore,	Falcetti	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 found	 strong,	
contemporaneous	feedback	effects	from	growth	to	reforms,	concluding	that	reforms	are	followed	by	growth	
rather	than	the	other	way	round,	and	that	higher	growth	in	turn	encourages	further	reforms	suggesting	the	
possibility	of	a	virtuous	circle	of	reforms	and	growth	proceeding	in	tandem.
	 Furthermore,	Godoy	and	Stiglitz	(2006),	who	examined	the	role	of	initial	conditions,	legal	institutions	and	
privatization	speed	on	GDP	growth	in	26	transition	countries,	showed	that	the	speed	of	privatization	(not	to	be	
confused	with	 its	 level,	which	 is	 the	 topic	of	 this	paper),	 is	negatively	associated	with	growth,	and	 they	
underline	the	importance	of	legal	institutions	in	the	transition	process.
	 Finally,	Gouret	(2007),	 just	 like	Bennett	et	al.	 (2004),	 investigated	the	impact	of	different	privatization	
methods	in	a	panel	data	study	involving	more	than	25	transition	economies	over	the	period	of	the	1990s	and	
concluded	that	privatization	has	the	most	beneficial	effect	on	a	country’s	output	if	it	is	done	through	gradual	
sales	of	state	property	or	using	the	method	of	management	and	employee	buyout	(MEBO),	which	was	the	
case	in	most	of	the	non-USSR	transition	countries,	rather	than	through	massive	giveaways,	as	happened	in	
most	of	the	former	USSR.
	 The	present	study	differs	from	previous	ones	on	three	main	points,	including	its	more	focused	sample,	its	
estimation	methods	using	country	clusters	and	dynamic	models,	and	its	focus,	which	is	on	privatization	only,	
and	not	on	indicators	of	transition	progress	in	general.
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3.	 Sample,	data	and	estimation	strategy
3.1	Sample
	 The	majority	of	the	empirical	studies	so	far	seem	to	have	focused	on	all	 transition	economies.	However,	
considering	 that	 these	countries	are	 in	fact	vastly	heterogeneous	 in	 terms	of	culture,	economic	structure,	
human	development,	resource	endowment,	politics	and	history	among	other	aspects,	 the	present	study	only	
focuses	on	the	ones	that	have	been	able	to	transform	their	economies	relatively	successfully	and	which,	as	a	
partial	result	of	this,	have	been	able	to	join	the	EU,	namely	Bulgaria,	the	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Lithuania,	
Latvia,	Hungary,	Poland,	Romania	and	Slovakia.	Furthermore,	 taking	 into	account	 the	split	 that	existed	
between	Soviet-style	and	independent	communist	regimes,	countries	like	Slovenia	and	Croatia,	which	are	part	
of	or	acceding	to	the	EU,	have	not	been	included	due	to	the	significant	differences	between	their	relatively	
liberal	economic	background	and	that	of	the	countries	in	the	study,	which	all	had	Soviet-style	economies.
3.2	Variables	and	data	sources
	 Since	this	paper	 is	focused	on	investigating	the	effects	of	privatization	on	GDP	growth,	 two	indices	of	
privatization	were	used	as	independent	variables	–	the	small-scale	privatization	index	(hereafter	SSP)	and	the	
large-scale	privatization	 index	(hereafter	LSP)	provided	by	 the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	
Development	(EBRD)	to	assess	privatization	in	transition	countries	(1	is	equivalent	 to	the	lowest	 level	of	
privatization	progress,	4.33	being	the	highest).	Importantly,	the	fact	that	EBRD	does	not	provide	data	on	the	
Czech	Republic,	which	is	also	the	most	advanced	among	the	countries	of	interest,	resulted	in	its	exclusion	
from	the	analysis.
	 Other	macroeconomic	indicators	used	as	control	independent	variables,	were	selected	based	on	other	studies.	
These	include	trade,	proxied	by	the	amount	of	imports	and	exports	as	percentage	of	GDP,	as	well	as	FDI,	
accounted	for	by	using	both	the	amounts	of	FDI	stock	and	FDI	inflows,	all	taken	from	the	UNCTAD	database.	
Other	macroeconomic	variables	controlled	for	were	the	levels	of	unemployment	taken	from	the	IMF	database,	
and	urban	population	and	employment	levels,	as	well	as	gross	enrollment	rates	 in	tertiary	education	rates	
taken	from	the	World	Bank	database.	Data	on	the	GDP	per	capita,	in	purchasing	power	standards,	which	is	
used	as	a	dependent	variable	throughout	the	regressions,	was	taken	from	the	IMF	database.
	 The	panel	data	covers	the	period	between	the	fall	of	the	communist	regimes	in	1989	and	the	year	2008,	which	
marked	the	beginning	of	the	world	economic	crisis,	and	by	which	year	all	of	the	countries	in	the	sample	had	
already	joined	the	EU.
3.3	Estimation	model
	 In	contrast	to	other	studies	which	analyze	the	overall	effect	of	privatization,	the	aim	of	this	study	was	to	
 273The	Effects	of	Small	versus	Large-Scale	Privatization	on	GDP	Growth	in	EU	Transition	Economies	
compare	only	 the	effects	of	SSP	versus	LSP,	so	 the	econometric	model	used	for	 testing	their	effects	was	
formulated	as1）:	
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is	GDP	per	capita	in	purchasing	power	parity	(PPP)	terms,	‘α’	is	a	constant	term,	‘SSP’	and	
‘LSP’	are	respectively	the	small	and	large-scale	privatization	indices	provided	by	the	EBRD,	‘X’	is	a	vector	of	
other	variables	influencing	growth	(listed	in	section	3.2)	and	‘u’	is	the	error	term.
	 In	this	analysis,	in	contrast	to	other	studies,	the	effects	of	SSP	and	the	LSP	were	analyzed	separately,	and	only	
the	per	capita	PPP	GDP	was	used	as	a	dependent	variable,	instead	of	output	like	in	Zinnes	et	al.	(2001)	and	
Gouret	(2007)	or	an	index	of	macroeconomic	stability,	 like	in	Gouret	(2007).	SSP	and	LSP	were	analyzed	
separately	because	they	are	highly	correlated	on	the	one	hand,	and	because	it	is	interesting	to	compare	their	
effects,	on	the	other.	
4.	 Data	analysis
4.1	Pooled	OLS	and	fixed-effects	regressions
	 First,	a	correlation	test	was	run	to	identify	the	presence	of	multicollinearity	within	the	independent	variables.	
Since	no	multicollinearity	was	identified,	as	a	first	step	of	 the	analysis	of	 the	panel	data	a	pooled	robust-
standard	errors	OLS	regression	was	performed	to	estimate	the	model.	The	results	show	a	positive	but	non-
significant	effect	of	small	scale	privatization.	Using	LSP	instead	of	SSP,	as	well	as	using	the	average	of	LSP	
and	SSP,	which	is	to	say	privatization	as	a	whole,	turns	out	to	have	no	significant	effects	on	GDP	either.	This	
is	so	far	in	line	with	more	recent	studies.	Using	the	logarithms	of	the	variables,	however,	shows	positive	effect	
for	LSP	alone	(coefficient	=	.589,	p	=.002,	table	not	shown	here),	while	SSP	has	no	significant	effects.	
	 To	control	for	country-specific	effects,	the	same	model	was	calculated	with	a	dummy	variable	for	the	Baltic	
states	(Estonia,	Lithuania	and	Latvia	which	share	particular	characteristics	such	as	being	significantly	smaller	
than	the	other	states	and	having	been	part	of	the	USSR),	and	with	a	dummy	variable	for	identifiably	slower	
reformers	(the	Balkan	states	–	Bulgaria	and	Romania).	The	dummy	variable	for	the	slow	reformers,	coded	as	
‘Early	reformer’,	splits	the	countries	according	to	whether	they	had	achieved	a	value	of	3	on	the	index	of	SSP	
 1）	 For	example,	Gouret	(2007)	estimated	the	effects	of	privatization	on	macroeconomic	performance	in	25	transition	countries	in	the	period	1990	
to	2001	by	estimated	a	model	which	involved	constructing	an	index	of	privatization	progress	combining	EBRD’s	indexes	for	SSP,	LSP	and	the	
share	of	the	private	sector	of	GDP.
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by	the	year	1994.	This	was	done	in	accordance	with	Bjørnskov	(2011)	who	argued	that	the	period	spanning	
1989-1994	was	“a	window	of	opportunity”	and	was	therefore	crucial	for	the	subsequent	development	of	these	
countries.	Using	this	specification,	the	effect	of	SSL	is	reversed,	becoming	negative	and	highly	significant:
Table 1.  Pooled OLS regression showing the cross-country effects of SSP on GDP.
Linear	regression Number	of	obs	=	135
F	(10,	124)	=	137.13
Prob	>	F	=	0.0000
R-squared	=	0.8826
Root	MSE	=	1540.3
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
SSP	index -897.47 165.22 -5.43 0.00 -1224.49 -570.45
Imp	Exp	%GDP 18.53 5.39 3.44 0.00 7.86 29.19
FDI	inflows 31.94 45.02 0.71 0.48 -57.17 121.05
FDI	stock 71.88 19.51 3.68 0.00 33.27 110.48
Tertiary	enroll 154.16 16.06 9.60 0.00 122.37 185.94
Urban	pop -186.83 44.90 -4.16 0.00 -275.70 -97.95
Male	empl	rate 74.59 68.36 1.09 0.28 -60.72 209.89
Unempl -163.66 42.62 -3.84 0.00 -248.02 -79.30
Baltic	state -2884.59 750.18 -3.85 0.00 -4369.40 -1399.78
Early	reformer 4206.76 307.12 13.70 0.00 3598.88 4814.63
_cons 9596.81 6930.91 1.38 0.17 -4121.40 23315.02
	 The	 same	 test	using	LSP	 reveals	LSP	has	no	 significant	effects	on	GDP,	unlike	SSP.	LSP+SSP,	or	
privatization	as	a	whole,	has	a	similar	effect	to	SSP	alone.
	 Since	the	effect	reversal	carries	the	implication	of	the	presence	of	a	significant	heterogeneity	in	the	effects	of	
SSL	across	countries,	as	a	second	step	of	the	analysis	a	Hausmann	test	was	run	to	identify	whether	a	random	
or	a	fixed-effects	model	should	be	used	in	order	 to	obtain	more	reliable	results.	Since	the	Hausmann	test	
yielded	a	significant	systematic	difference	 in	coefficients	 (p>.01),	a	 fixed	effects	 robust	standard	errors	
regression	was	run	next:
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Table 2.  Fixed effects estimation of the effects of SSP on GDP.
Fixed-effects	(within)	regression
Group	variable:	country
R-sq:	within	=	0.8813
R-sq:	between	=	0.1553
R-sq:	overall	=	0.6511
corr	(u_i	.	Xb)	=	-0.1431
Number	of	obs	=	135
Number	ofgroups	=	8
Obs	per	group:	min	=	10
Obs	per	group:	avg	=	16.9
Obs	per	group:	max	=	19
F	(7,	7)	=	.
Prob	>	F	=	.
(Std.	Err.	Adjusted	for	8	clusters	in	country)
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
SSP	index -715.37 223.89 -3.20 0.02 -1244.77 -185.94
Imp	Exp	%GDP -0.83 6.28 -0.13 0.89 -15.69 14.03
FDI	inflows 1.19 57.57 0.02 0.98 -134.93 137.32
FDI	stock 78.78 16.49 4.78 0.00 39.78 117.78
Tertiary	enroll 168.96 11.23 15.05 0.00 142.41 195.51
Urban	pop -232.77 279.35 -0.83 0.43 -893.32 427.78
Male	empl	rate 178.87 127.51 1.40 0.20 -122.65 480.39
Unempl -199.88 67.39 -2.97 0.02 -359.25 -40.52
Baltic	state (omitted)
_cons 8881.77 13169.25 0.67 0.52 -22258.55 40022.1
signa_u 2308.52
sigma_e 1356.63
rho 0.74 	(fraction	of	the	variance	due	to	u_i)
	 The	fixed-effects	estimation	revealed	a	negative	and	this	time	significant	impact	of	SSL	on	GDP.		In	contrast,	
LSP	exhibited	no	significant	effects.	A	differenced	regression	using	first	differences	draws	the	same	picture	for	
both	SSP	and	LSP:
Table 3.  Differenced regression showing the cross-country effects of SSP on GDP.
Linear	regression Number	of	obs	=	127
F	(8,	118)	=	12.36
Prob	>	F	=	0.0000
R-squared	=	0.3669
Root	MSE	=	520.89
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
D.SSP	index -706.24 139.22 -5.47 0.00 -962.14 -450.35
D.Imp	Exp	%GDP -0.80 1.89 -0.42 0.67 -4.56 2.96
D.FDI	inflows 8.88 13.76 0.65 0.52 -18.38 36.14
D.FDI	stock 1.94 9.01 0.22 0.83 -15.89 19.78
D.Tertiary	enroll 4.49 19.94 0.23 0.82 -34.98 43.98
D.Urban	pop -327.69 262.32 -1.25 0.21 -847.15 191.77
D.Male	empl	rate 83.95 52.39 1.60 0.11 -19.81 187.71
D.Unempl -110.37 28.99 -3.81 0.00 -167.78 -52.96
_cons 781.42 104.98 7.44 0.00 573.52 989.31
	 To	obtain	more	robust	results,	all	variables	were	converted	to	logarithms	and	then	the	tests	were	performed	
again.	The	results	were	highly	consistent	with	the	ones	obtained	using	the	level	data.	The	fixed	effects	model	
implies	that	whereas	1%	increase	in	the	SSP	index	leads	to	a	0.22%	decrease	in	GDP	(p	=	0.075),	LSP	has	no	
effect	on	GDP	growth.
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	 The	analyses	so	far	reveal	an	opposite	effect	of	SSP	to	the	one	argued	in	favor	of	in	most	of	the	academic	
literature	on	the	topic.	Since	this	 is	quite	striking,	additional	 tests	were	run	to	check	the	robustness	of	the	
results	before	drawing	any	conclusions.
4.2	Accounting	for	differences	among	countries
	 To	further	investigate	the	issue	of	how	the	effects	of	SSP	and	LSP	differ	among	countries,	the	panel	data	was	
split	 into	three	groups	and	a	robust	error	pooled	OLS	regression	using	log	variables	was	run	separately	for	
every	group.	The	eight	countries	were	divided	into	Balkan countries	(Bulgaria	and	Romania,	characterized	
with	a	lower	GDP	per	capita	than	the	other	6	countries,	joined	the	EU	3	years	later	than	the	others,	in	2007,	
and	the	only	Orthodox	countries	in	the	sample),	the	Baltic states	(Estonia,	Latvia	and	Lithuania,	characterized	
by	having	been	part	of	USSR,	all	having	very	small	populations	and	low	population	densities	relative	to	the	
other	sample	countries,	acceded	to	the	EU	in	2004),	and	the	Visegrad group	(Hungary,	Poland	and	Slovakia,	
perceived	as	the	most	advanced	of	the	CEEC	countries	being	adjacent	to	Germany	and	Austria,	joined	the	EU	
in	2004,	historically	referred	to	as	“the	Visegrad	group”).2）	
4.2.1	 Bulgaria	and	Romania
	 The	results	show	that	while	the	SSP	had	no	significant	effect	on	GDP	growth	in	the	Balkan	countries	(p	=	
0.176),	LSP	had	a	very	large	and	positive	effect.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	neither	FDI	inflows	nor	FDI	stock	
nor	trade	turned	out	to	have	any	significant	impact.	The	shedding	of	labor	resulting	from	bankrupt	industries	
(including	privatized	ones)	is	quite	significant	and	negative	as	is	observable	from	the	effect	of	the	variable	
‘log	unemployment’.
Table 4.  Linear regression showing the effects of LSP on GDP using log variables.
Linear	regression Number	of	obs	=	127
F	(8,	118)	=	12.36
Prob	>	F	=	0.0000
R-squared	=	0.3669
Root	MSE	=	520.89
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
logLSP	index 0.34 0.10 3.31 0.00 0.13 0.56
logImp	Exp	%GDP 0.15 0.13 1.18 0.25 -0.11 0.40
logFDI	inflows 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.93 -0.10 0.11
logFDI	stock -0.02 0.05 -0.46 0.65 -0.13 0.08
logTertiary	enroll 0.45 0.09 4.83 0.00 0.26 0.65
logUrban	pop 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.78 -0.47 0.62
logMale	empl	rate 0.82 0.56 1.46 0.15 -0.33 1.97
logUnempl -0.38 0.05 -7.55 0.00 -0.49 -0.28
_cons 3.46 3.05 1.13 0.27 -2.78 9.70
 2）	 Some	authors,	notably	Berglof	and	Bolton	(2002),	refer	to	the	more	general	phenomenon	of	differences	in	transition	progress	as	the	“great	
divide”:	Berglof	and	Bolton	define	the	group	of	successful	countries	as	 the	ones	who	acceded	in	2004	and	the	rest,	 including	Bulgaria,	
Romania,	Russia	and	Ukraine,	he	concludes,	are	on	the	“wrong”	side	of	the	great	divide.
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4.2.2	 The	Visegrad	group
	 In	contrast	to	the	Balkan	countries,	in	Hungary,	Poland	and	Slovakia	both	SSP	(p	<	0.00,	coefficient	=	-0.28)	
and	LSP	(p	=	0.08,	coefficient	=-0.27)	had	a	negative	effect,	which	puts	the	effects	of	these	factors	on	the	
opposite	end	of	the	spectrum.	Furthermore,	FDI	stock	appears	to	have	been	crucial	for	GDP	growth	in	the	
Visegrad	group	(p	<	0.00,	coefficient	>	0.24	in	both	specifications),	again	in	stark	contrast	 to	 the	Balkan	
countries.	Overall,	 the	only	things	that	 the	two	groups	seem	to	have	in	common	are	the	facts	 that	 tertiary	
education	played	a	positive	(p	<	0.00,	coefficient	>	0.27),	and	unemployment	–	a	negative	role	(p	<	0.00,	
coefficient	>	-0.19)	for	GDP	growth.
4.2.3	 The	Baltic	States
	 Finally,	in	the	Baltic	States	neither	SSP	(p		=	0.480)	nor	LSP		(p	=	0.172)	had	any	significant	effect	on	GDP	
growth,	in	contrast	to	the	Visegrad	and	the	Balkan	groups.	However,	just	like	the	Visegrad	group,	and	unlike	
the	Balkan	group,	FDI	stock	seems	to	have	been	an	important	factor	(p	<	0.02,	coefficient	>	0.28).	And	just	
like	in	the	other	two	groups,	education	(p	<	0.01,	coefficient	>	0.41)	and	especially	labor	participation	rates	(p	
<	0.01,	coefficient	>	1.83)	turn	out	to	have	influenced	growth	significantly	in	the	expected	positive	direction.	
Interestingly,	the	level	of	urbanization	(p	<	0.01,	coefficient	>	-7.28)	is	negatively	and	strongly	related	to	GDP	
growth	in	the	Baltics,	possibly	reflecting	a	declining	agricultural	production,	as	a	result	of	uncompetitive	
production	and	migration	to	cities	in	search	of	better	opportunities.
4.2.4	 Summary	of	the	effects	of	country-group	specific	pooled	OLS	regressions
Table 5.  Summary of the effects of country-group specific pooled OLS regressions.
Balkan Vishegrad Baltics
SSP No	effect Negative No	effect
LSP Positive Negative No	effect
*(significance	level:	p	<	0.10)
	 At	this	point,	two	conclusions	are	in	line.	First,	privatization	seems	to	have	had	more	negative	than	positive	
effects	on	GDP	growth	when	controlling	for	other	important	growth	factors,	and	second,	that	the	effects	of	
privatization	are	country-specific.	The	 latter	conclusion	might	serve	as	a	substantiation	of	 the	argument	
against	pooling	all	transition	countries	together,	as	has	been	done	in	other	empirical	studies.
4.3	Dynamic	panel	data	estimations
	 As	further	tests	of	robustness,	and	to	account	for	the	potential	endogeneity	of	the	independent	variables,	as	
well	as	for	heteroskedasticity	and	autocorrelation,	a	robust	dynamic	panel	data	estimation,	in	which	lagged	
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GDP	is	controlled	for,	was	performed.3）	The	dynamic	equations	take	the	following	form:
GDPpc
i,t
	=	αGDPpc
i,t-1 + β1SSPi,t	 + β2Xi,t + μi,t	+	εi,t,	i	=	1,…,	8,	t	=	1,…,	20.	
	 	 	 	 	 and
GDPpc
i,t
	=	αGDPpc
i,t-1 + β1LSPi,t	 + β2Xi,t + μi,t	+	εi,t,	i	=	1,…,	8,	t	=	1,…,	20.
where	GDPpc
i,t
	is	the	level	of	GDP	(in	per	capita	terms)	of	country	i in	year	t ,	GDPpc
i,t-1	
is	its	lagged	value,	X
i,t
 
is	a	vector	of	explanatory	variables,	μ
i,t
	is	an	unobservable	country-specific	effect,	and	ε
i,t
	is	the	error	term.
	 As	is	well-known,	including	a	lagged	dependent	variable	in	a	panel	framework	is	problematic	and	the	simple	
within-groups	estimator	is	biased	due	to	the	correlation	between	the	lagged	dependent	variable	and	the	error	
term	(i.e.	due	to	autocorrelation).	Therefore,	the	results	from	the	autocorrelation	test	developed	by	Arellano	
and	Bond	(1991)	were	also	 taken	into	account.	However,	since	none	of	 the	outputs	displayed	significant	
evidence	of	serial	correlation	in	the	first-differenced	errors,	the	tests	were	considered	statistically	valid.	The	
same	tests	were	run	using	a	non-robust	specification,	with	the	Sargan	test	of	overidentifying	restrictions	to	
control	for	serial	correlation,	and	the	results	turned	out	to	be	highly	consistent	with	the	robust	ones.	The	ones	
reported	hereafter	are	the	results	obtained	from	the	robust	standard	error	specification.
4.3.1	 Dynamic	model:	Baltics
	 The	dynamic	robust	standard	errors	one-step	model	for	the	Baltic	countries	displayed	no	significant	effects	
for	SSP	on	GDP	growth.	On	 the	contrary,	LSP	displayed	positive	contemporaneous	effects	 (p	=	0.00,	
coefficient	=	828.46)	and	negative	effects	for	the	first	lag	(p	=	0.00,	coefficient	=	-315.71).	The	second	lag	
showed	no	significant	effects	(p	=	0.57).
Table 6.  The effect of LSP on GDP in Baltic countries: dynamic panel-data estimation.
Arellano-Bond	dynamic	panel-data	estimation
Group	variable:	country
Time	variable:	year
Number	of	instruments	=	37
One-step	results
Number	of	obs	=	36
Number	of	groups	=	3
Obs	per	group:	min	=	9
Obs	per	group:	avg	=	12
Obs	per	group:	max	=	14
Wald	chi2(2)	=	3.49
Prob	>	chi2	=	0.17
(Std.	Err.	Adjusted	for	clustering	on	country)
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. z P	>	|z| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
GDP	per	cap
L1. 1.07 0.19 5.62 0.00 0.69 1.45
L2. -0.32 0.25 -1.27 0.20 -0.80 0.17
LSP
. 828.46 15.53 53.36 0.00 798.03 858.89
L1. -315.71 89.81 -3.52 0.00 -491.74 -139.68
L2. -197.45 346.73 -0.57 0.57 -877.03 482.14
 3）	 The	corresponding	command	in	Stata	is	‘xtabond’.
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4.3.2	 Dynamic	model:	Balkans
	 When	applied	to	the	Balkan	states,	the	model	showed	negative	contemporaneous	effect	of	SSP	(p	=	0.00,	
coefficient	=	-52.69),	positive	effect	for	the	first	lag	(p	=	0.02,	coefficient	=	115.03)	and	a	negative	effect	for	
the	second	lag	(p	=	0.00,	coefficient	=	-177.02),	none	of	which	coincide	with	the	results	obtained	for	the	Baltic	
states.	In	any	case,	the	effects	of	SSP	on	Balkan	economies	did	not	turn	out	to	be	very	large.	As	for	LSP,	its	
contemporaneous	effect	proved	negative	(p	=	0.00,	coefficient	=	-140.68),	whereas	the	first	and	second	lags	
had	no	significant	effects	(p	=	0.99	and	0.29,	respectively).
Table 7.  The effect of SSP on GDP in Balkan countries: dynamic panel-data estimation.
Arellano-Bond	dynamic	panel-data	estimation
Group	variable:	country
Time	variable:	year
Number	of	instruments	=	35
One-step	results
Number	of	obs	=	34
Number	of	groups	=	2
Obs	per	group:	min	=	17
Obs	per	group:	avg	=	17
Obs	per	group:	max	=	17
Wald	chi2(2)	=	5.34
Prob	>	chi2	=	0.02
(Std.	Err.	Adjusted	for	clustering	on	country)
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. z P	>	|z| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
GDP	per	cap
L1. 1.20 0.04 30.85 0.00 1.13 1.28
L2. -0.31 0.13 -2.30 0.02 -0.57 -0.05
SSP
. -52.69 6.29 -8.38 0.00 -65.01 -40.37
L1. 115.03 49.78 2.31 0.02 17.48 212.59
L2. -177.02 38.19 -4.63 0.00 -251.87 -102.16
4.3.3	 Dynamic	model:	Visegrad
	 The	results	 for	 the	Visegrad	states	showed	 large	positive	contemporaneous	effects	of	SSP	(p	=	0.00,	
coefficient	=	610.26),	and	negative	effects	for	both	 the	first	 lag	(p	=	0.00,	coefficient	=	-411.23)	and	the	
second	lag	(p	=	0.00,	coefficient	=	-256.25).	LSP,	on	the	other	hand,	only	showed	effects	for	the	first	lag,	and	
these	effects	were	negative	(p	=	0.00,	coefficient	=	-294.24).	
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Table 8.  The effect of SSP on GDP in Visegrad countries: dynamic panel-data estimation.
Arellano-Bond	dynamic	panel-data	estimation
Group	variable:	country
Time	variable:	year
Number	of	instruments	=	48
One-step	results
Number	of	obs	=	47
Number	of	groups	=	3
Obs	per	group:	min	=	13
Obs	per	group:	avg	=	15.67
Obs	per	group:	max	=	17
Wald	chi2(2)	=	20.05
Prob	>	chi2	=	0.00
(Std.	Err.	Adjusted	for	clustering	on	country)
GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. z P	>	|z| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
GDP	per	cap
L1. 1.33 0.19 6.93 0.00 0.95 1.71
L2. -0.44 0.22 -1.96 0.05 -0.88 0.00
SSP
. 610.26 72.89 8.37 0.00 467.39 753.12
L1. -411.23 106.39 -3.87 0.00 -619.74 -202.71
L2. 256.25 74.16 -3.46 0.00 -401.61 -110.89
Table 9.  Summary of the effects of different variables in the dynamic models.
Batlics Balkans Visegrad
Contemp. Lagged Contemp. Lagged Contemp. Lagged
SSP No	effect No	effect Negative Ambiguous Positive Negative
LSP Positive Negative Negative No	effect No	effect Negative
5.	 Discussion	
5.1	Discussion	of	results	obtained	from	dynamic	models
	 Relative	to	the	other	variables	in	the	model,	privatization	seems	to	have	less	clear	and	consistent	effects.	
From	the	tests	so	far,	it	is	visible	that	privatization	as	a	whole	has	had	a	rather	negative	effect	on	GDP	growth	
in	the	Visegrad	countries.	Small-scale	privatization	alone	seems	to	bring	about	a	momentary	positive	effect,	
which,	however,	becomes	negative	in	a	longer	run.	In	the	Baltic	countries	the	situation	is	almost	identical,	
though	it	is	large	rather	than	small-scale	privatization	that	displays	a	momentarily	positive	effect.	This	might	
be	due	to	the	rather	small	size	of	these	economies,	where	the	privatization	of	a	large-scale	enterprise	might	
have	had	a	more	direct	and	immediate	effect	on	GDP	than	in	the	rest	of	 the	countries	 in	 the	sample.	The	
results	obtained	for	 the	Visegrad	group	and	 the	Baltics	could	also	be	attributed	 to	a	simultaneity	 issue	
discussed	by	Falcetti	et	al.	(2006).	In	this	train	of	thought,	assuming	that	it	 is	economic	growth	that	drives	
future	privatization	rather	 than	 the	other	way	round,	 the	fact	 that	 if	each	year	 is	considered	 in	 isolation	
privatization	and	GDP	growth	are	in	fact	positively	correlated,	can	be	accounted	for	easily.	
	 Another	consideration	that	could	help	explain	the	negative	relationship	is	the	fact	that	at	the	time	when	most	
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of	 the	privatization	 took	place	 in	 the	 fast	 reformer	countries	 (the	early	1990s),	most	of	 them	actually	
experienced	negative	GDP	growth	 rates	 (except	Poland),	 and	 later	when	GDP	 started	 to	grow,	 the	
privatization	process	had	largely	been	completed	and	therefore	privatization	indices	remained	unchanged.	
This	suggests	a	 transition	from	negative	 to	no	effect	 to	a	potentially	positive	effect,	which	seems	 to	be	
supported	by	the	data	analysis.	Indeed,	comparing	the	effects	of	privatization	with	one	versus	two	lags	reveals	
that,	at	least	in	the	Visegrad	group,	a	quadratic	effect	of	privatization	seems	to	be	an	adequate	explanation	–	it	
appears	 that	 the	most	negative	effect	 is	for	 the	first	and	not	 the	second	lag	of	 the	SSP	and	LSP	variables,	
meaning	that	there	might	be	a	period	of	structural	adjustment	lasting	about	a	year,	bringing	about	short-term	
negative	effects	that	wear	off	subsequently,	potentially	turning	into	positive	ones.	
	 In	fact,	graphing	the	change	in	total	privatization	versus	the	change	in	GDP	per	capita	shows	a	quadratic	
trend	which	is	very	slight	in	fast	reformers	and	well	expressed	in	slower	reformers.4）	The	observed	clear-cut	
quadratic	relationship	between	privatization	progress	and	GDP	growth	in	the	Balkan	countries	(especially	in	
Bulgaria)	could	be	attributed	to	the	slower	pace	of	the	reforms5）,	and	the	ambiguous	effect	of	privatization	
obtained	from	the	regressions	might	be	then	explained	both	by	the	quadratic	trend	itself	and	by	the	presence	
of	an	intervening	variable,	such	as	the	quality	of	institutions.
5.2	The	qualitative	dimension	of	privatization
	 Brada	(1996)	stresses	that	while	the	extent	of	privatization	is	crucial	for	transition	success,	the	abilities	of	
new	owners	 are	 equally	 important,	because	 in	 case	privatization	 fails	 to	provide	effective	corporate	
governance,	economies	would	not	be	moving	toward	capitalist	systems	in	the	conventional	sense,	but	rather	
toward	some	form	of	non-state	socialism	or	corporatism.	Additionally,	Popov	(2001)	argues	 that	strong	
institutions	are	more	important	than	the	speed	of	reforms.	These	arguments	basically	take	into	consideration	
the	qualitative,	rather	than	the	quantitative	dimension	of	privatization,	which	is	very	hard	to	measure,	but	
which	might	well	be	the	reason	for	the	existing	discrepancy	between	the	fast	and	the	slow	reformers,	reflected	
in	the	latters'	lower	GDP	per	capita	nowadays	and	also	in	the	fact	that	they	joined	the	EU	3	years	later	than	the	
fast	reformers.	
	 Consequently,	 if	 the	quality	of	 reforms	 is	more	 important	 than	speed,	 it	makes	sense	 to	consider	how	
privatization	differed	in	more	versus	less	successful	reformers.	Gouret	(2007)	classified	privatization	methods	
into	three	main	categories	and	in	his	study	encompassing	25	transition	countries	he	found	that	of	all	types	of	
privatization,	the	one	effected	by	gradual	sales	had	in	fact	the	most	positive	impact	on	economic	growth.	The	
second	best	type	of	privatization	proved	to	be	MEBO	(management	and	employee	buyout)	and	the	one	with	
 4）	 Not	included	here	for	space	considerations.	
 5）	 To	give	a	better	idea,	as	far	as	SSP	is	concerned,	the	Visegrad	group	and	Baltics	had	achieved	a	score	of	3.7	by	1994,	whereas	the	Balkan	
countries	achieved	that	score	significantly	later	–	Bulgaria	in	2000	and	Romania	in	1999.	(EBRD)
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the	least	positive	impact	on	GDP	was	found	to	be	massive	giveaways.	Additionally,	Gouret	found	that	 the	
difference	between	 the	former	 two	methods	 is	muted	when	cumulative	FDI	per	capita	 is	accounted	for.	
Finally,	he	concluded	that	methods	of	privatization	leading	to	a	permanent	change	in	the	ownership	structure	
of	the	economy	might	have	different	effects	on	the	output	level,	but	not on	the	annual	growth	rate.
	 The	findings	in	the	present	study	indeed	confirm	the	lack	of	relation	between	methods	of	privatization	and	
GDP	growth,	but	they	are	inconsistent	with	Gouret’s	hierarchy	of	privatization	methods,	as	some	of	the	fast	
reformers	 in	 fact	use	massive	giveaways	 (Lithuania	and	Latvia),	while	 the	slow	reformers	use	MEBO	
(Romania)	and	gradual	sales	(Bulgaria).	This	takes	us	back	either	to	the	simultaneity	issue,	or	to	the	issue	of	
an	intervening	variable,	such	as	the	quality	of	institutions.	In	this	connection,	Gouret’s	research	implies	that	
the	intervening	variable	might	not	be	institutions,	but	rather	FDI,	which	seems	to	be	confirmed	by	the	present	
study.	Considering	that	FDI	and	the	amount	of	reforms	are	positively	correlated6）,	and	that	FDI	has	barely	
positive	effects	 in	 the	Balkan	countries	(in	contrast	 to	 the	other	 two	groups),	 it	might	be	posited	that	 the	
investors	interested	in	investing	in	the	region	chose	the	early	reformers,	which	benefitted	from	it,	in	contrast	to	
slow	reformers.
5.3	Potential	problems	with	the	estimations
	 Finally,	 it	should	be	mentioned	that	data	on	GDP	can	lack	precision	in	transition	economies	due	to	 the	
substantial	size	of	 the	 informal	sector.	Hernández-Catá	(1997),	Johnson	et	al.	 (1997)	and	Kaufmann	and	
Kaliberda	(1996)	express	suspicions	that	the	official	national	accounts	in	transition	countries	underestimate	
the	output	by	a	substantial	margin.	 In	 the	same	vein,	Bartholdy	(1997)	discusses	 the	 issue	of	how	when	
reporting	GDP	statistics	weak	statistical	agencies	overemphasized	the	existing	large	industries,	many	of	which	
reduced	output	drastically	or	shut	down,	and	failed	to	include	new	businesses	in	the	formal	data.	Hence,	any	
interpretations	of	the	effects	of	privatization	on	GDP	growth	should	be	taken	with	a	grain	of	salt	even	though	
statistics	tend	to	be	more	reliable	in	the	countries	that	joined	the	EU	as	compared	to	other	transition	countries.
	 An	additional	problem	concerning	the	validity	of	the	dynamic	estimations	is	that	after	the	commonly	used	
augmented	Dickey-Fuller	 test	was	performed	 for	 the	dependent	variable,	both	differenced	and	non-
differenced,	for	every	panel	of	the	data	(not	reported	here),	it	turned	out	that	data	on	GDP	per	capita	is	non-
stationary.	In	fact,	 this	confirms	a	well-known	trend:	a	good	amount	of	existing	research	(Rapach,	2002)	
indicates	that	real	GDP	per	capita	levels	are	non-stationary	in	general,	and	that	using	panel	unit	root	 tests	
instead	of	 times-series	ones	does	not	make	a	practical	difference.	 Indeed,	 the	STATA	module	 'madfuller'	
confirmed	that	series	under	consideration	are	realizations	of	I(1),	or	non-stationary,	stochastic	processes.	
Therefore,	the	results	obtained	from	the	dynamic	tests	cannot	be	considered	completely	unequivocal.
 6）	 Not	correlated	highly	enough	to	suggest	problems	of	multicollinearity	in	the	analyses	above	though.
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5.4	Conclusions
	 In	contrast	to	earlier	studies	and	generally	consistent	with	the	conclusions	of	more	recent	studies,	which	find	
that	privatization	has	no	impact	on	economic	growth	if	a	set	of	institutional	structures	is	not	in	place,	and	that	
privatization	per se	 is	not	enough	to	generate	macroeconomic	performance	gains,	 the	main	findings	and	
conclusions	of	 this	 study	are	 the	 following:	 first,	privatization	does	have	different	effects	 in	different	
countries;	second,	an	increase	in	privatization	has	(at	least	short-term)	negative	effects	on	GDP	growth;	third,	
large	and	small	scale	privatization	are	not	very	different	in	their	effects	on	GDP;	fourth,	privatization	methods	
might	influence	industrial	output	but	not	GDP	as	a	whole;	fifth,	the	quality	of	institutions	and	the	amount	of	
FDI	might	override	the	effects	of	privatization,	making	it	a	net	negative	contributor	to	growth;	and	sixth,	there	
is	a	quadratic	relationship	between	privatization	progress	and	GDP	growth	combined	with	a	lagged	effect	that	
turns	from	negative	to	neutral	or	positive	in	the	long	run.
References
ANDERSON,	Terry	L.	and	Peter	J.	Hill	 (eds).	 (1996).	Privatization Process: A Worldwide Perspective.	Lanham,	MD,	
Rowman	and	Littlefield	Publishers.
ARELLANO,	Manuel	and	Stephen	Bond.	(1991).	“Some	tests	of	specification	for	panel	data:	Monte	Carlo	evidence	and	an	
application	to	employment	equations”.	Review of Economic Studies	58,	pp.277-297.
BARTHOLDY,	Kasper,	1997.	“Old	and	new	problems	in	the	estimation	of	national	accounts	 in	 transition	economies”.	
Economics of Transition	5	(1),	pp.131-146.	
BENNETT,	John,	Saul	Estrin,	James	Maw	and	Giovanni	Urga.	(2004).	“Privatization	methods	and	economic	growth	in	
transition	economies”.	Centre for Economic Policy Research 4291.
BERG,	Andrew,	Eduardo	Borensztein,	Ratna	Sahay,	and	Jeromin	Zettelmeyer.	(1999).”The	evolution	of	output	in	transition	
economies:	Explaining	the	differences”.	Working paper 99/73.	IMF.
BERGLOF,	Erik	and	Patrick	Bolton.	(2002)	“The	Great	Divide	and	Beyond:	Financial	Architecture	in	Transition”,	The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives,	Vol. 16,	No.1,	pp.77-100.
BJØRNSKOV,	Christian	and	Niklas	Potrafke.	(2011).	“Politics	and	privatization	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe:	A	panel	
data	analysis”.	Economics of Transition	19	(2),	pp.201-230.	
BOLTON,	Patrick	and	Gerard	Roland.	(1992).	“Privatization	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe”,	Economic Policy.	Vol. 15,	
pp.275-303.
BRADA,	Josef	C.	(1996).	“Privatization	is	Transition	-	Or	is	it?”.	The Journal of Economic Perspectives,	Vol. 10,	No.2,	
pp.67-86.
DE	MELO,	Martha,	Cevdet	Denizer,	Alan	Gelb	and	Stoyan	Tenev.	(2001).	“Circumstance	and	choice:	The	role	of	initial	
conditions	and	policies	in	transition	economies”.	World Bank Economic Review	15,	pp.1-31.
DE	MELO,	Martha,	Cevdet	Denizer	and	Alan	Gelb.	(1996),	“Patterns	of	Transition	from	Plan	to	Market”,	World Bank 
Economic Review,	Vol. 3:	pp.397-424.
DJANKOV,	Simeon	and	Peter	Murrell.	(2000).	“Enterprise	Restructuring	in	Transition:	A	Quantitative	Survey”,	Working 
Paper,	University	of	Maryland.
国際公共政策研究  第18巻第 1 号284
EBRD.	(2009).	Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 2009.		Privatization	indices	retrieved	from	http://
www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml/	in	Feb.	2013.
FALCETTI,	Elisabetta,	Tatiana	Lysenko	and	Peter	Sanfey.	(2006).	“Reforms	and	growth	in	transition:	Re-examining	the	
evidence”.	Journal	of	Comparative	Economics	34,	pp.421-445.
FALCETTI,	Elisabetta,	Martin	Raiser	and	Peter	Sanfey.	(2002).	“Defying	the	odds:	Initial	conditions,	reforms,	and	growth	
in	the	first	decade	of	transition”.	Journal of Comparative Economics	30,	pp.229-250.
FISCHER,	Stanley,	Ratna	Sahay	and	Carlos	Végh.	(1996a).	“Economies	in	transition:	The	beginning	of	growth”.	American 
Economic Review	86,	pp.229-233.
FISCHER,	Stanley,	Ratna	Sahay	and	Carlos	Végh.	(1996b).	“The	stabilization	and	growth	in	transition	economies:	The	
early	experience”.	Journal of Economic Perspectives	10,	pp.45-66.
GODOY,	Sergio	and	Stiglitz,	Joseph	E.	(2006).	“Growth,	Initial	Conditions,	Law	and	Speed	of	Privatization	in	Transition	
Countries:	11	Years	Later”.	NBER	Working	Paper	No.	11992.
GOURET,	Fabian.	 (2007).	 “Privatization	and	output	behavior	during	 the	 transition:	Methods	matter!”.	Journal of 
Comparative Economics	35,	pp.3-34.
HAVRYLYSHYN,	Oleh	and	Ron	van	Rooden.	(2003).	“Institutions	matter	in	transition,	but	so	do	policies”.	Comparative 
Economic Studies	45,	pp.2-24.
HAVRYLYSHYN,	Oleh.	(2001).	“Recovery	and	growth	in	transition:	A	decade	of	evidence”.	IMF Staff Papers	48,	pp.53-
87.
HAVRYLYSHYN	Oleh	and	McGettigan	D.	(1999).	“Privatisation	in	Transition	Countries:	 	a	sampling	of	the	literature”,	
Working Ppaper 99/6.	International	Monetary	Fund,	Washington,	DC.
HERNÁNDEZ-CATÁ,	Ernesto.	 (1997).	“Liberalization	and	 the	behavior	of	output	during	 the	 transition	from	plan	 to	
market”.	IMF Staff Papers	44,	pp.405-429.
IMF.	World	Economic	Outlook	Database.	 (2012).	Retrieved	 from	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/
weodata/weoselagr.aspx/	in	Feb.	2013.
JOHNSON,	Simon,	Daniel	Kaufmann	and	Andrei	Shleifer.	 (1997).	“The	unofficial	economy	in	 transition”.	Brooking 
Papers on Economic Activity	2,	pp.	159–221.	
KAUFMANN,	Daniel	and	Aleksandr	Kaliberda.	(1996).	“Integrating	the	unofficial	economy	into	the	dynamics	of	post-
Socialist	economies:	A	framework	of	analysis	and	evidence.”	Working paper 1691.	World	Bank	Policy	Research.
POPOV,	Vladimir.	(2001).	“Lessons	from	Transition	Economies:	Strong	Institutions	Are	More	Important	than	the	Speed	of	
Reforms.”	Draft paper prepared for the discussion at the UNRISD meeting on “The Need to Rethink Development 
Economics” 7-8 September 2001.
RAPACH,	David	E.	(2002).	“Are	Real	GDP	Levels	Nonstationary?	Evidence	from	Panel	Data	Tests”.	Southern	Economic	
Journal	68	(3),	pp.	473-495.
SUNITA,	Kikeri,	John	R.	Nellis	and	Mary	M.	Shirley.	(2002).	Privatization: The Lessons of Experience.	World	Bank,	
Washington,	DC.
UNCTAD	Statistical	database.	(2012).	Retrieved	from	http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_
referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en	in	Feb.	2013.
WORLD	BANK.	World	Development	Indicators.	(2012).	Retrieved	from	http://databank.worldbank.org/	in	Feb.	2013.
ZINNES,	Clifford,	Yair	Eilat	and	Jeffrey	Sachs.	(2001).	“The	gains	from	privatization	in	transition	economies:	Is	change	of	
ownership	enough?”.	IMF Staff Papers	48,	pp.146-170.
